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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 200300710-CA
Trial Court No. 021912683

-v.ROBERT GIBSON,
Defendant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over all criminal convictions
that do not involve a first-degree felony or a capital offense pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). Because the contested conviction is an Appeal From
Conviction For One Count of Violating a Protective Order, a Class A
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1), the Utah Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue. Did the trial judge render a guilty verdict based on an incorrect
standard of criminal negligence, were facts from trial an impermissible
variance from the information filed, was the evidence presented at trial

sufficient to sustain a conviction and was the Protective Order issued against
the Defendant unconstitutionally vague?
Standard of Review. On appeal, State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, Tf 5; 84 P.
3d 1167,1168, provides the correct standard of review for issues of fact.
Gordon holds that the standard of review for findings of fact for bench trial is
to, "sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against clear weight of
evidence/'
Preservation. Issues that are the basis of this appeal were the basis for
Defendant's defense at trial court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statute is relevant to this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 21, 2002, the Defendant was charged by information with
one count of violating a Protective Order sexual abuse of a minor, a Class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1). (Information).
On April 17,2003, before Judge Paul Maughan of the Third District
Court, the Defendant was found guilty of violating a Protective Order. (R. 89:
49, lines 8-9).

On June 23, 2003, Judge Maughan sentenced the Defendant to 180 days
in jail (granting 24 days for time served and suspending the remaining 156
days) and ordered the Defendant to pay a fine of $350. (R. 90:11, lines 20-21).
On August 26, 2003, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On July 30, 2002 Tamara Gibson was granted a Protective
Order shielding herself and her two daughters, R.G. and C.G., from the
Defendant. (State's Exhibit 1) The Protective Order specifically
prohibited the Defendant from frequenting the schools attended by his
daughters. (State's Exhibit 1, p. 2, item 5). The Oquirrh Middle School is
not listed by name on the Protective Order.
On October 31,2002, the victim R.G. observed the Defendant
waiting in his vehicle in the parking area outside of her school. (R. 89: 5,
lines 15-22). Later that same day, R.G. again saw the Defendant passing
by the school in his vehicle. (R. 89:10, lines 19-20). That same afternoon,
the Defendant went to the residence of Mike Black, near the school,
specifically because the Defendant believed R.G. was at the residence
with Mr. Black's son. (R. 89:10, lines 22-24 and Information).

1

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the
trial court's verdict. See State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,11 2, 12 P.3d 92.
i

On July 28, 2003 Third District Judge Paul G. Maughan found the
Defendant guilty of violating the Protective Order following a bench trial. (R.
89: 49, lines 8-9). Judge Maughan specifically found the Defendant guilty for
parking his car in the student drop-off area of R.G/s school. (R. 89: 49, lines 1013). Judge Maughan found that the testimony of R.G. that the Defendant was
in the student drop-off area to be credible and found the Defendant's contrary
claims not to be credible. (R. 89: 49, line 10; 50 lines 4-6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the conviction of the Defendant was consistent with the
Information filed. Defendant claims that the facts borne out in court stand as
an impermissible variance from the information filed. Specifically, the
Information filed charged Defendant with a violation of the Protective Order
for parking at the school his daughter attended. The trial court in fact based
the Defendant's conviction on testimony from R.G. that Defendant was parked
at the school and convicted him on a charge consistent the Information filed.
Second, facts presented at trial were sufficient to support the conviction. The
trial court judge, within the discretion allowed a trier of fact, found that the
testimony of R.G. that Defendant was parked at the school in violation of the
Protective Order to be credible. Third, the trial court applied the correct legal
standard of knowingly and intentionally violating the Protective Order in

reaching the guilty verdict. Defendant claimed that he did not know his
daughter attended the Oquirrh Hills Middle School, Judge Maughan found
this testimony, "not to be credible". The judge found that the Defendant knew
his daughter attended that school, and therefore when Defendant went to the
school, he was knowingly and intentionally violating the Protective Order.
Fourth, the Protective Order was not unconstitutionally vague. The Protective
Order clearly prohibited the Defendant from appearing at his daughter's
school, and the trial court found claims that Defendant didn't know where his
daughter attended school not to be credible. Making the Protective Order
clear enough that even the Defendant understood its implication.
The trial court verdict in this case was supported by the evidence,
notably the testimony of R.G. The conviction was based on a proper and clear
Protective Order, and the correct legal standard was applied and the
Defendant's conviction should stand.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED BY INFORMATION WITH
VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER ON OCTOBER 31,2002 AT
OQUIRRH MIDDLE SCHOOL AND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED CONFORMED TO THE FORMAL CHARGE.
The information charging the Defendant stated that on October 31, 2002,

at 12949 South 2700 West, in Salt Lake County, the Defendant knowingly or
intentionally violated a protective order that was properly served on him. At

trial, the testimony was that on October 31, 2002, the Defendant parked his
vehicle at 12949 South 2700 West, Oquirrh Middle School, and made contact
with R.G. The fact that the evidence given at trial by S.G. and Mrs. Black did
not conform to the Defendant's own belief of what the facts should be, does
not violate the notice requirement. Furthermore, the fact that a witness was
not called to testify at trial to incidents mentioned in the probable cause
statement of the Information does not cause an impermissible variance.
Therefore, based on the information, the Defendant was on sufficient notice to
defend against the charge.
Under Utah law, there are two sources which require a defendant to be
given notice of the charges against him; Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and due process under the Utah constitution. Rule 4 states that an
"information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to
give the defendant notice of the charge/7 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
4(b). In this case, the Information specifically stated the Defendant was being
charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108, Violation of a Protective
Order. Accordingly he was placed on notice as to what the specific charges
were.

Generally, a defendant is "entitled to whatever information the
prosecutor has that may be useful in helping to fix the date, time and place of
the offense." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115,118 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Rule 4(e)
of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure specifically states that if more
information is required to prepare a defense, the defendant may file a bill of
particulars. In this case, the Defendant requested, and was provided, a copy
of the police reports and other items detailing the evidence upon which the
prosecution would rely at trial. The Defendant has not alleged that he was
surprised by any of the evidence. Nor did the Defendant file any bill of
particulars. Again, there is ample evidence the Defendant was placed on
notice that he was being charged for violating a protective order by parking at
Oquirrh Middle School on October 31, 2002.
Although Defendant likens his arguments to those addressed in State v.
Burnett, these comparisons are misplaced. State v. Burnett 712 P.2d 260, 262
(Utah 1985). Burnett was originally charged for stealing from one victim (his
firm), then tried for stealing from other victims. That is not the case here. The
Defendant was charged with violating a Protective Order, at Oquirrh Middle
School on October 31,2002. The Defendant was convicted for violating a
protective order at Oquirrh Middle School on October 31, 2002. The
conviction was based on S.G/s testimony that Defendant was parked outside

of the school. The Defendant's claim that "Mr. Gibson was found to have only
been in the vicinity of the school" demonstrates his reluctance to marshal the
evidence, as required, and goes to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, not
notice. (Appellate Brief p.l)
II.

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND THE DEFENDANT
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY VIOLATED A
PROTECTIVE ORDER WHERE THE DEFENDANT PARKED AT
R.G/S SCHOOL AND FOLLOWED HER TO A FRIEND'S HOME.

When reviewing a trial court's finding of facts, the appellate court will
"sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against clear weight of
evidence." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, | 5; 84 P. 3d 1167,1168. To succeed
when challenging a finding of fact of the trial court, the defendant "may not
simply reargue [his] position based on selective excerpts of evidence presented
to the trial court." ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 256
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Defendant must first marshal all the evidence in
support of the guilty verdict and then show that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support a guilty verdict even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the trial court's findings. Id.
When determining what the evidence is, "[tjrial courts are given
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact." State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994), overruled on other grounds by Campbell v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,65 P.3d 1134. A reviewing court must
"resolv[e] all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court's determination." Id. at 936 (citing Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.,
711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985)).
A reviewing court is highly deferential to the trial court because it
is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to
be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive
a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court
cannot hope to garner from a cold record.

Id. (citing In re I. Children, 664 P.2d 1158,1161 (Utah 1983)).
In this case, the Defendant fails to marshal the evidence, and merely
attempts to reargue his position. The trial court specifically found the
testimony of R.G. to be more credible. (R. 89: 5). Yet, the Defendant repeatedly
argues his version of the facts. The trial court found that the Defendant's
claim he accidentally went to his daughter's school was not credible.
Therefore, the facts, when looking at them in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings are: the Defendant was prohibited from frequenting schools
attended by R.G.; the Defendant went to the school he knew R.G. was
attending; the Defendant parked at the school; the Defendant observed R.G.
and made eye contact with, and smiled at her (R. 89:10,19-20); the Defendant
came back to the school; the Defendant followed R.G. to a friend's home.

Q

Based on these facts, there was sufficient evidence to find the Defendant
knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL
STANDARD WHEN IT FOUND THE DEFENDANT
KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY CONTACTED R.G. IN
VIOLATION OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1), requires that a person "intentionally or
knowingly" violate a Protective Order to be found guilty. The trial court
concluded that the Defendant did knowingly and intentionally violate the
Protective Order. The trial judge stated that he did not believe Defendant's
claim that he "accidentally" showed up at R.G/s school, stating, "I don't find it
credible that you were just innocently going to [the school] - that you
happened to be at that location at the time school was out." (R. 89: 50). The
trial judge held that the Defendant knowingly went to R.G/s school in direct
violation of the Protective Order.
The Defendant's claim that the judge applied the wrong standard at trial is
based on a conversation the Defendant had with the trial court after the trial
court found him guilty and after the trial court made its findings of fact. The
Defendant inquired what actions he could take to avoid violating the
protective order in the future. (R. 89: 50). The Defendant reargued his trial
claim that even though he knows that R.G. spends time across the street from

in

his house and that her school is in his neighborhood, the one thing he didn't
know was that R.G. attended that school. The trial court reiterated its position
that he did not believe the Defendant's claims that he was unaware R.G.
attended school there, (R. 89: 50, 6), and then told the Defendant that he could
not be around the school and that if he chose to take the route by the school he
would be running a risk of violating the protective order. (R. 89: 50,17). The
trial court refused to give an advisory opinion to the Defendant, but reiterated
that on October 31, 2002 the Defendant did violate the protective order. The
trial court judge was not changing the legal standard he used, but he was
merely making a point to the Defendant as to what he should consider in the
future. When the court stated that the Defendant, "should have known" it
was not expressing the standard employed by the trial judge when rendering
the guilty verdict.
IV,

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-108 IS CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT IS NARROWLY DRAWN AND RESTRICTS CONDUCT
NECESSARY TO SERVE THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST OF
PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

The Defendant asserts that the statute he was convicted of violating was
unconstitutionally vague. Vagueness questions are procedural due process
issues. State v. Hall 905 P.2d 899 (Utah Ct. App.1995). The Defendant has not
preserved this argument for appeal, therefore, this argument should not be
considered on appeal. However, even if the Defendant properly raised the

constitutional issues, the statute under which he was convicted is
constitutional. When determining whether a statute is constitutional, the
Court presumes that legislative acts are constitutional, and a defendant
challenging a statute bears a "heavy 'burden of demonstrating its
unconstitutionality//, State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, |8,84 P.3d 1171 (quoting
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991)).
A.

The Defendant Did Not Preserve a Constitutional
Vagueness Argument by His Objections That He Did Not
Know R.G. Attended Oquirrh Middle School.

It is well settled that "Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
361 (Utah Ct.App.l993)(quoting VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distrib.,
758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah Ct.App.1988)); see State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244
f 14. 54 P.3d 645, 648-9. Where a defendant fails to make an argument at the
trial court level, but raises the argument for the first time on appeal, "appellate
courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional issue,... unless
the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional
circumstances/7 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 359.
In this case, the Defendant did not raise the constitutional vagueness
argument to the trial court prior to, or subsequent to the guilty verdict. The

only reference the Defendant made regarding vagueness at trial is on page 46
of the Trial Transcript where the Defendant argued that the protective order is
a "little vague." (R. 89: 46 line 14). There was no mention at the trial that the
protective order was constitutionally vague. Although the Defendant claims
he argued the statute was vague, his argument went solely to refute the mens
rea of the prohibited conduct. He claimed that because the protective order
did not list his daughter's school by a specific address, that he could not have
known she was attending school there, and therefore, could not have
"intentionally" nor "knowingly" violated the protective order. Neither
argument implicates the constitutional doctrines of vagueness. For these
reasons, this Court should not consider these constitutional issues for the first
time on appeal.
B.

The Statute is Not Vague Because the Conduct Prohibited
is Specifically Defined in the Statute and Incorporated
Into the Protective Order.

The Defendant continuously asserts that because the protective order
did not specifically list the address of the school where R.G. was attending,
that the protective order was vague. The vagueness doctrine has been applied
to statutes only. The Defendant's argument that he could not have known he
could not go to Oquirrh Middle School is a defense to the mens rea of
"intentionally" or "knowingly," not a constitutional argument regarding a

11

statute. Furthermore, any argument that §76-5-108(1) is constitutionally vague
is unsupportable.
When a statute does not implicate constitutionally protected conduct, a
statute is only void for vagueness where "the statute is impermissibly vague in
all of its applications.,, State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 12, 84 P.3d 1171
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489,494-95,102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). If a statute is clear as
applied to the Defendant, he cannot complain that the law is vague as applied
to others. Only when a statute is not clear as applied to the defendant, must
the defendant demonstrate "either (1) that the statutes do not provide 'the
kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand what conduct [is
prohibited]/ or (2) that the statutes 'encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement/" Id. at 113 (quoting State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 31, 57 P.3d 977));
see also Elks Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
905 P.2d at 1202. (finding "[a]n enactment will be held unconstitutionally
vague only if the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary
intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts conform to the law/').
In this case, the Defendant acknowledges that he knew he was not to
contact his daughter or go to places she frequented. Therefore, the statute is

not vague regarding him, and because it provided the Defendant notice, he
cannot complain the law is vague on its face.
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1), places the ordinary person on
notice that certain conduct is prohibited. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1)
specifically states "[a]ny person who is the respondent or defendant subject to
a protective order . . . who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after
having been properly served, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor/' The statute
specifically references Title 30, Chapter 6 to designate the process by which a
protective order is obtained. Incorporating other sections or even regulations
is permissible and sufficient to provide notice sufficient to overcome a
vagueness challenge, see State v. Robinson, 2001 UT 21, |24, 20 P.3d 396.
Therefore, any ordinary person would know that they could not intentionally
or knowingly violate orders written in the protective order they were properly
served with.
Although the Defendant couches his argument in constitutional terms of
vagueness, he is rearguing his claim that he did not intentionally or knowingly
violate the protective order. The Defendant never argues that he was unaware
he could not contact his daughter, as ordered by the protective order. The
Defendant was aware of what conduct was prohibited. His claim does not
dispute whether his behavior was prohibited, but whether he intentionally

1^

and knowingly engaged in that behavior, which is a question of the sufficiency
of the evidence, not vagueness. The trial court believed R.G/s testimony and
held that the Defendant did know his daughter attended school at Oquirrh
Middle School and went there intentionally and knowingly. See supra Part III.
CONCLUSION
The trial court decision was proper and the judge acted within his legal
authority when he (1) relied on Rachel's testimony and not the Defendant's
due to credibility concerns, (2) applied the criminal standard of knowingly
and intentionally, and (3) convicted the Defendant on trial findings consistent
with the information filed.
The Protective Order against the Defendant was not overly broad. The
Protective Order clearly forbids the Defendant from frequenting his
daughter's school and the trial court held that the Defendant did in fact know
that his daughter went to Oquirrh Middle School. In the case at hand,
avoiding the school does not burden the Defendant's constitutional rights.
After weighing the testimony of the witnesses, the fact-finder believed
testimony of the victim and not the Defendant. With a lack of "clear and
weighty" evidence to the contrary, this is not a finding that can be overturned.
A trial court does not overstep its discretion when finding one witness more
credible than another. The trial court found that the Defendant appeared at

the school he knew his daughter to attend twice, thus he knowingly and
intentionally violated his Protective Order.
The Defendant knowingly and intentionally violated a sound and
sufficiently clear Protective Order. Therefore the State asks this court to
uphold the Defendant's conviction for violating the Protective Order and deny
this appeal.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's conviction on one count of violating
a Protective Order by the trial court should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY submitted on this 5th day of August 2004.
DAVID YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
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R. Josh/Player
Depjfty District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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